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ABSTRACT
Modern face recognition systems leverage datasets containing im-
ages of hundreds of thousands of specific individuals’ faces to train
deep convolutional neural networks to learn an embedding space
that maps an arbitrary individual’s face to a vector representation
of their identity. The performance of a face recognition system in
face verification (1:1) and face identification (1:N) tasks is directly
related to the ability of an embedding space to discriminate between
identities. Recently, there has been significant public scrutiny into
the source and privacy implications of large-scale face recognition
training datasets such as MS-Celeb-1M and MegaFace, as many
people are uncomfortable with their face being used to train dual-
use technologies that can enable mass surveillance. However, the
impact of an individual’s inclusion in training data on a derived
system’s ability to recognize them has not previously been studied.
In this work, we audit ArcFace, a state-of-the-art, open source face
recognition system, in a large-scale face identification experiment
with more than one million distractor images. We find a Rank-1
face identification accuracy of 79.71% for individuals present in
the model’s training data and an accuracy of 75.73% for those not
present. This modest difference in accuracy demonstrates that face
recognition systems using deep learning work better for individ-
uals they are trained on, which has serious privacy implications
when one considers all major open source face recognition training
datasets do not obtain informed consent from individuals during
their collection.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; • Computing methodologies → Visual content-based
indexing and retrieval; • Computer systems organization→
Neural networks; • Social and professional topics → Surveil-
lance.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Face recognition systems using Deep Convolutional Neural Net-
works (DCNNs) depend on the collection of large image datasets
containing thousands of sets of specific individuals’ faces for train-
ing. Using this data, DCNNs learn a set of parameters that can
map an arbitrary individual’s face to a feature representation, or
faceprint, that has small intra-class and large inter-class variability.
The ability of a face recognition system to distinguish between
identities within this embedding space depends on the size and
diversity of its training data, along with its model capacity and
underlying algorithms. Face recognition systems have benefited
from the enabling power of Internet in the collection of large-scale
image datasets and from hardware improvements in enabling effi-
cient training of large models. Recently, increased attention to face
recognition by academia, industry and government has brought
new researchers, ideas and funding to the field, leading to perfor-
mance improvements on benchmark tasks Labelled Faces in the
Wild (LFW) [20] and MegaFace [32]. Consequently, face recogni-
tion systems are now being integrated into consumer and industrial
electronic devices and offered as application programming inter-
faces (APIs) by providers such as Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, Megvii
and Kairos. However, along with improved performance has come
increased public discourse on the ethics of face recognition systems
and their development.
Algorithmic auditing of commercial face analysis applications
has uncovered disparate performance for intersectional groups
across several tasks. Poor performance for darker skinned females
by commercial face analysis APIs has been reported by Buolamwini,
Gebru and Raji [5, 35], as has lower accuracy in face identification by
commercial systems with respect to lower (darker) skin reflectance
by researchers at the US Department of Homeland Security [9]. As
bias in training data begets bias in model performance, efforts to
create more diverse datasets for these tasks have resulted. IBM’s
Diversity in Faces dataset [28], released in January 2019, is a direct
response to this body of research. Using ten established coding
schemes from scientific literature, researchers annotated one mil-
lion face images in an effort to advance the study of fairness and
accuracy in face recognition. However, this dataset has seen public
scrutiny from a different, but equally notable perspective. A March
2019 investigation by NBC News into the origins of the dataset
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brought to the public conversation the issue of informed consent
in large-scale academic image datasets, as IBM leveraged images
from Flickr with a Creative Commons Licence without notifying
content owners of their use [40].
To rationalize the collection of large-scale image datasets without
explicit consent of individuals, some computer vision researchers
appeal to the non-commercial nature of their work. However, work
by Harvey et al. at MegaPixels have found that authors’ stated limi-
tations on dataset use do not translate to real-world restrictions [16].
In the case of Microsoft’s MS-Celeb-1M dataset, authors included
an explicit “non-commercial research purpose only" clause with
the dataset, which was the largest publicly-available face recogni-
tion dataset at the time. However, as the dataset has been cited in
published works by the research arms of many commercial entities,
findings cannot easily be isolated from improvements in product of-
ferings. As a direct result of MegaPixel’s work on the ethics, origins,
and privacy implications of face recognition datasets, MS-Celeb-1M
[15], Stanford’s Brainwash dataset [41] and Duke’s Multi-Target,
Multi-Camera dataset [37] were removed from their authors’ web-
sites in June 2019. However, in the case of MS-Celeb-1M, the data
remains accessible via torrents, derived datasets and other hosts
[16].
In addition to issues of bias and informed consent in data col-
lection, the general use of face recognition systems by commercial
and government agencies has been raised by civil rights groups and
research centers, as there is no oversight for its deployment in civil
society [1, 49]. For these and other reasons, multiple cities in the
United States have banned the use of face recognition systems for
law enforcement purposes [8, 36, 51]. Many people are concerned
with their identify being used to train the dual-use technology that
is face recognition. With reports of face recognition being used by
law enforcement entities to identify protesters in London [4] and
Hong Kong [29], and measures enacted to ban face masks in the
latter location [53], there is merit in understanding the impact of
one’s inclusion in the training data that fuels the development of
these systems.
In an effort to inform the conversation about informed consent
and privacy in the domain of face recognition, we conduct exper-
iments on a state-of-the-art system. The goal of this work is to
determine the impact of an individual’s inclusion in face recogni-
tion training data on a derived system’s ability to recognize them.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to
investigate this relationship.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following man-
ner; section two outlines ethical considerations for some decisions
in the design and implementation of this work, section three pro-
vides background for the taxonomy, algorithms and data used in
face recognition research, section four outlines the design of exper-
iments used to address the research question, section five presents
our results and adds discussion and the paper concludes in section
six.
2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2.1 Intent
The intent of this work is to investigate the performance of face
recognition systems with respect to inclusion in training datasets.
While one interpretation of this work may be to motivate efforts to
mitigate demographic bias in the development of face recognition
systems, it should be noted that increasing the performance of face
recognition systems in any context can increase their ability to be
used for oppressive purposes. In addition, due to historical societal
injustices against marginalized populations and racially-biased po-
lice practices in the United States, a disproportionate number of
African Americans and Hispanics are present in mugshot databases,
often used by law enforcement agencies as data sources for face
recognition systems [14, 31]. These populations are therefore poised
to receive a greater burden of the effects of improved face recog-
nition systems. We therefore position this work as informing the
discussion on data privacy and consent when it comes to face recog-
nition systems and do not advocate for technical improvements
without a larger discussion on the appropriate use and legality of
the technology.
2.2 Use of MS-Celeb-1M
As noted in the introduction, the MS-Celeb-1M dataset was re-
moved from Microsoft’s website in June 2019. In a response to a
Financial Times inquiry, Microsoft stated the website was retired
“because the research challenge is over” [30]. However, a version of
this dataset with detected and aligned faces from a “cleaned” subset
of the original images is available from the Intelligent Behaviour
and Understanding Group (iBUG) at Imperial College London. The
dataset was offered as training data for the “Lightweight Face Recog-
nition Challenge & Workshop”1 the group organized at ICCV 2019.
The group has pre-trained face recognition models available as
benchmarks for the challenge, trained on this data.
As this work aims to conduct experiments in a realistic setting
in order to better inform the conversation around data collection
processes, the analysis of a state-of-the-art model, trained on a
large dataset is necessary to gain insights that are applicable to
commercial applications. We therefore have decided to use the MS-
Celeb-1M dataset, through its derived version offered for the ICCV
2019 Workshop, for the limited scope of this work.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Face Recognition Tasks
Within the domain of face recognition lies two categories of tasks:
face verification and face identification [24].
In face verification, the goal is to assess if a presented image
matches with the reference image of an individual, often to grant
access to a physical device or location. Unlocking a smartphone
with one’s face provides an example of face verification; a person
presents their face to a phone and it is verified against a reference
image of the known owner of the device. This task is referred to as
1:1 matching, as there is only one individual that the presented face
image is compared against. In order to confirm a match, a threshold
of similarity must be met, which can be set by the developer of a
system to meet a specific level of security. Performance of a system
on face verification tasks is reported in terms of accuracy; the
number of correct verifications of all verification attempts.
1https://ibug.doc.ic.ac.uk/resources/lightweight-face-recognition-challenge-
workshop/
Table 1: Prominent open-source face recognition training datasets
Dataset Year Released # Identities # Images Informed Consent Obtained? Source
CASIA WebFace 2014 10,575 494K No [52]
CelebA 2015 10,177 203K No [26]
VGGFace 2015 2,622 2.6M No [34]
MS-Celeb-1M 2016 99,952 10.0M No [15]
UMDFaces 2016 8,277 368K No [3]
MegaFace (Challenge 2) 2016 672,057 4.7M No [32]
VGGFace2 2018 9,131 3.3M No [6]
In face identification, a gallery of known identities is constructed
from face images of individuals in advance of testing. Subsequently,
a face image of unknown identity is presented to the system as the
probe. The probe is then matched for similarity with all images in
the gallery, constituting 1:N matching. If the system guarantees
that the identity of the probe is within the gallery of identities, the
problem is considered closed-set face identification, otherwise it is
considered open-set face identification.
Closed-set face identification tasks are common in academic
benchmarks, as galleries are carefully constructed by their authors
to contain all probes. In open-set face identification, a confidence
threshold must be set to reject matches that do not meet a certain
level of similarity. The selection of an appropriate threshold is es-
pecially relevant in high-risk applications such as law enforcement
in which false positives have significant implications.
Face identification performance is reported in terms of accuracy
in returning the correct identity of a probe from the gallery, or
in the open-set case, no identity if the probe does not exist in the
galley. Common performance metrics include Rank-1 accuracy; of
all identification attempts, the number of times the correct identity
in the gallery is the most similar identity to the probe, and Rank-10
accuracy; the number of times the correct identity is in the ten most
similar identities to the probe.
3.2 Deep Face Recognition
Rapid improvements in image classification in the ImageNet Large
Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) [38] by AlexNet [23],
ZFNet [54], GoogLeNet [42] and ResNet [17] from 2012 to 2015
cemented the DCNN as the standard method in computer vision
research and applications. While early uses of convolutional neural
networks in face verification showed preliminary success [7, 19],
it was not until the introduction of the aforementioned network
architectures that the modern era of deep face recognition was in
full swing. Coupled with innovations in loss function design and
access to larger image datasets, modern face recognition systems
have improved state-of-the-art performance on benchmark face ver-
ification and identification tasks significantly in the past six years.
For a complete survey of the development of deep face recognition
systems, please refer to the review paper by Wang and Deng [47];
the following is a brief summary of major milestones.
The first system to adapt findings from ILSVRC to face recogni-
tion was Facebook’s DeepFace [43], published in 2014 by Taigman
et al.. The nine-layer AlexNet-based model was trained on a private
dataset of 4.4M images of 4K identities and achieved state-of-the-art
accuracy on face verification tasks LFW and YouTube Faces (YTF)
[50], reducing the error rate by more than 50% on the latter task.
Following this work, Google introduced FaceNet in 2015 with a
major innovation in loss function design [39]. While the standard
softmax loss function optimized inter-class differences, researchers
found that intra-class differences remained high, problematic in the
domain of face recognition. To rectify this problem, the triplet loss
was introduced to jointly minimize the Euclidean distance between
an anchor example and a positive example of the same identity and
maximize the distance between an anchor and negative example.
Using a ZFNet-based model and a private dataset of 200M images of
8M identities, they achieved state-of-the-art performance on LFW
and YTF.
Innovations in loss functions dominated the next wave of im-
provements in benchmark tasks, motivated by improving discrimi-
nation between classes by making features more separable. Wen
et al. introduced the Center Loss in 2016 [48], followed by Liu et
al. with the Angular Softmax in 2017 [25]. The Large Margin Co-
sine Loss was introduced in 2018 by Wang et al. [46], and in 2019,
Deng et al. incorporated the Additive Angular Margin Loss into the
ArcFace model [10], considered state-of-the-art on multiple face
recognition benchmarks when published.
3.3 Face Recognition Training Datasets
Access to large-scale face recognition training datasets has been
essential to the development of modern solutions by the academic
community. While early published resulted in the DCNN-era of
face recognition came out of companies with access to massive
private datasets, such as Facebook’s 500M images and 10M identities
[44] and Google’s 200M images and 8M identities [39], the release
of several open-source datasets in the ensuing years has allowed
researchers to train models at scale. A summary of notable face
recognition training datasets of the past six years is provided in
Table 1. These datasets catalyzed the field of face recognition and
lead to great advances in model performance on benchmark tasks.
They largely consist of celebrity identities and copyrighted images
scraped from the internet.
One exception isMegaFace, which is derived from the YFCC100M
dataset of 100M photos with a Creative Commons Licence, from
550K personal Flickr accounts [45]. While the Creative Commons
Licence permits the fair use of images, including in this context,
Ryan Merkley, CEO of Creative Commons, noted the trouble of
conflating copyright with privacy in a March 2019 statement: “...
copyright is not a good tool to protect individual privacy, to address
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Figure 1: Experimental procedure to generate feature representations of images in gallery and probe sets from ArcFace model
research ethics in AI development, or to regulate the use of surveil-
lance tools employed online. Those issues rightly belong in the
public policy space, and good solutions will consider both the law
and the community norms of CC licenses and content shared online
in general” [27]. While MegaFace contains unknown, non-celebrity
identities, an October 2019 investigation by the New York Times
demonstrated that account metadata associated with images in the
dataset allows for a trivial real-world identification of individuals
[18].
In all datasets, no informed consent was sought or obtained for
individuals contained therein.
4 METHODOLOGY
4.1 Face Recognition Model
4.1.1 Training Data. We employ a cleaned version of theMS-Celeb-
1M dataset [15] as training data for a face recognition model in this
work. This dataset was prepared for the ICCV 2019 Lightweight
Face Recognition Challenge [11]. All face images were preprocessed
by the RetinaFace model for face detection and alignment [12]. A
similarity transformation was applied to each detected face using
five predicted face landmarks to generate normalized face crops of
112 x 112 pixels.
As the original version of this dataset has been shown to exhibit
considerable inter-class noise, efforts have been made to automati-
cally clean the dataset [21]. In the case of this version, after face de-
tection and alignment, cleaning was performed by a semi-automatic
refinement strategy. First, a pre-trained ArcFace model [10] was
used to automatically remove outlier images of each identity. A
manual removal of incorrectly labelled images by “ethnicity-specific
annotators" followed to result in a dataset of 5,179,510 images of
93,431 identities. We refer to this dataset as MS1M-RetinaFace.
4.1.2 Model. We select the ArcFace model [10] to study in this
work. ArcFace employs the Additive Angular Margin Loss and a
ResNet100 backbone to arrive at a 512-dimensional feature rep-
resentation of an input image. The model achieves a verification
accuracy of 99.83% on LFW and Rank-1 identification accuracy of
81.91% on the MegaFace Challenge 1 with one million distractors,
considered state-of-the-art results. We select the model for study as
is the top academic, open-source entrant on the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Face Recognition Vendor Test
(FRVT) 1:1 Verification2, a benchmark used bymany commercial en-
tities to validate the performance of their face recognition systems.
Pre-trained weights for this model were provided by iBUG.
4.2 Experiments
To determine the effect of inclusion in the training data of a face
recognition system on its ability to identify an individual, we frame
the problem as a closed-set face identification task. We construct
two probe datasets and perform face identification on a gallery
of one million distractor images. We assess the performance of
the model on the probe datasets in terms of Rank-1, Rank-10 and
Rank-100 identification accuracies. A visual representation of the
datasets used in this work is shown in Figure 1.
4.2.1 Probe Data. We construct two probe datasets from the VG-
GFace2 dataset [6]. Using regular expressions, we match identities
in VGGFace2 by name with the identify list of MS1M-RetinaFace.
We find 5,902 VGGFace2 identities present in MS1M-RetinaFace
and 3,229 VGGFace2 identities not present in the training dataset.
In each of these two groups, we randomly select 500 male identities
and 500 female identities for evaluation, based on gender labels
provided by VGGFace2 metadata. For each identity, we randomly
select 50 images and perform face detection and alignment with
the Multi-task Cascaded Convolutional Network (MTCNN) [55] to
generate normalized face crops of size 112 x 112 pixels. We refer to
the set of 50,000 images of 1000 identities present in the training
data as the in-domain probe set and the set of 50,000 images of
1000 identities not present in the training data at the out-of-domain
2https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/frvt-11-verification
Table 2: Face identification accuracies of ArcFace model on different probe image sets with one million distractor images
Metric Probe Set All Males Females
Rank-1 Accuracy (%) In-Domain 79.71 78.50 80.93
Out-of-Domain 75.73 77.30 74.17
Rank-10 Accuracy (%) In-Domain 90.82 90.92 90.73
Out-of-Domain 86.58 88.59 84.57
Rank-100 Accuracy (%) In-Domain 92.72 92.52 92.92
Out-of-Domain 89.22 90.59 87.84
probe set. We then generate 512-dimensional feature representa-
tions for all images in the in-domain and out-of-domain probe sets
by running them through ArcFace.
4.2.2 Gallery Data. We leverage the MegaFace Challenge 1 “Dis-
tractor” dataset [22] of 1,027,058 images of 690,572 identities to form
the basis of the gallery. We again apply MTCNN to generate nor-
malized face crops of 112 x 112 pixels for each image and run each
image through ArcFace to generate 512D feature representations
of all images in the gallery.
4.2.3 Evaluation Protocol. The experiments conducted in this work
follow the protocol of MegaFace Challenge 1, with our probe sets in
place of the standard FaceScrub test set [33]. We employ the Linux
development kit offered by MegaFace to perform evaluation. Each
probe set is evaluated following Algorithm 1; a written description
of this protocol follows.
A probe set contains 1000 identities, each with 50 images rep-
resented as 512D features. For each identity, we iterate over their
images, adding one image to the gallery at a time, which we will
refer to as the needle. We then iterate over the remaining 49 images,
using each one as a probe. We rank all images in the gallery by
L2 distance in feature space to the probe, and record the position
of the needle in the ranked list. We report results for each probe
set in terms of Rank-1, Rank-10 and Rank-100 face identification
accuracies.
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present results of the experiments in Table 2 for Ranks 1, 10
and 100. We find there is a modest increase in face identification
accuracy for identities present in the training data, compared to
those who are not. In-domain identities have a 4.0% higher iden-
tification accuracy than out-of-domain identities at Rank-1, 4.2%
higher at Rank-10, and 3.5% higher at Rank-100. Although not a
significant margin, these results suggest that modern DCNN-based
face recognition systems are biased towards individuals they are
trained on.
The disparate performance between probe sets suggests some
amount of overfitting has occurred in the model. Although the
model generalizes well to new identities, as evidenced by results
on benchmarks LFW, MegaFace and on NIST’s FRVT, these results
indicate that the 93k identities the system is trained on are more
easily identifiable in a large-scale study. As the model’s Additive
Angular Margin Loss sought to increase discrimination between
classes by making features more separable, it appears the model
Algorithm 1: Closed-set face identification evaluation
Result: Rank-1, 10 and 100 face identification accuracies for a
probe set.
r1, r10, r100 = 0;
gallery contains 1M distractor images;
for identity in identities1 to 1000 do
for imageneedle in images1 to 50 do
add imageneedle to the gallery;
for imageprobe in images1 to 50 do
if imageneedle == imageprobe then
continue;
else
rank all images in gallery by L2 distance to
imageprobe in feature space;
if imageneedle in first position in ranked list
then
r1 = r1 + 1
if imageneedle in first 10 positions in ranked list
then
r10 = r10 + 1
if imageneedle in first 100 positions in ranked
list then
r100 = r100 + 1
remove imageneedle from gallery;
Rank-1Acc. = r1/(1000 × 50 × 49);
Rank-10Acc. = r10/(1000 × 50 × 49);
Rank-100Acc. = r100/(1000 × 50 × 49);
has learned to map identities to the same feature representation
more consistently for those it has seen before.
We also investigated the role of gender in the performance of the
face recognition model. We find small differences in performance
between genders for in-domain identities, but a 3 - 4% decrease in
performance for females compared to males who are out-of-domain,
across all ranks. These results suggest that a gender bias exists in the
face recognition model towards female identities. As the model has
a smaller drop in face identification accuracy between domains for
males, it has a greater ability to generalize to new male identities.
While we do not have gender labels available for all identities
in MS1M-RetinaFace, recent work has demonstrated that large-
scale face recognition datasets are largely biased towards lighter-
skinned males [28]. A representational bias in MS1M-RetinaFace
may account for this disparate performance across genders. Looking
at these results in a different way, the consistent performance for
in-domain identities across genders is perhaps more evidence that
the model is overfitting to identities it has seen before. If the model
only had a gender bias, we would have seen disparate performance
for genders on both probe sets, however, these results suggest the
model may also exhibit a “training inclusion bias”.
Results of this study lead to the question; is the bias towards
individuals in training data truly a consequence of overtraining, or
is this a fundamental element of deep face recognition models? If
we look to the manner by which the model was trained, overfitting
in a traditional sense seems unlikely, as early stopping was em-
ployed, and results on held-out test identities demonstrate strong
generalization. Perhaps there is a generalization gap in performance
between in-domain and out-of-domain identities that is not appar-
ent in current validation protocols, and increased regularization
can mitigate this gap. Further testing on different training datasets
and model architectures will be necessary to gather more evidence
to answer this question.
We did not analyze the effect of skin type on face recognition
model performance in this study, as skin type annotations were not
available to us at the time. However, two considerations were made
to attempt to control for effects of skin type in these results. First, the
selection of 1000 identities for each probe set is far larger than what
is used in the standard protocol of MegaFace Challenge 1, where 80
identities are sampled from FaceScrub. Having a larger sample size
helps to control for identities who may have either superior or poor
performance due to possible model bias. In addition, the approach of
random sampling in-domain and out-of-domain probe sets ensures
both contain a similar distribution of identities with respect to skin
type, with the assumption that the identities common to MS1M-
RetinaFace and VGGFace2 and the identities distinct to VGGFace2
follow the same distribution of skin type. As bothMS1M-RetinaFace
and VGGFace2 use the popularity of celebrities online to construct
identity lists, this assumption seems to be reasonable. Having said
this, the role of skin type in the performance of the model is a very
important relationship to study, and this is planned for future work.
Fitzpatrick skin type [13] annotations will need to be collected for
all individuals in VGGFace2 such that sampling can be done to
ensure even representation in probe sets across gender and skin
type, and to determine intersectional accuracy.
The results of this study are quite concerning from a privacy
and informed consent perspective. As described in the background
section on Face Recognition Training Datasets, there does not exist
a major open-source dataset that gathers informed consent from
the individuals it contains. Without these individuals’ knowledge
or permission, the systems trained on their identities have a greater
ability to identify them. As face recognition becomes more power-
ful and ubiquitous, the ability for misuse becomes greater. While
MS-Celeb-1M contains only “celebrity" identities, this classifica-
tion of an individual should not negate informed consent in the
development of powerful surveillance technologies. Face recogni-
tion systems are unique among biometrics as the face can be easily
captured at distance without one’s knowledge. The face uniquely
identifies an individual, and it is difficult to opt-out of these systems
without wearing a mask or other means of obfuscation, drawing
undue attention to one’s self. From a legal perspective, the concept
of informed consent in the analysis of images of individuals’ faces
has traction in some jurisdictions. As reported by the New York
Times with reference to potential financial liabilities of MegaFace
[18], the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act [2] is a State
law enacted in 2008 that gives Illinois residents the right to seek
financial compensation from entities using their face scans without
their informed consent.
The experiments in this work aim to simulate a real-world testing
environment of a state-of-the-art face recognition system, with a
gallery of more than one million images. These findings, therefore,
may hold for systems that are currently deployed in the real-world.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work we present the first study to investigate the role of
inclusion in face recognition training data on a derived system’s
ability to identify an individual. Through the construction of two
sets of probe data that overlap and are distinct from the training
data of a state-of-the-art system, we conduct a large-scale face iden-
tification experiment. We find a modest 4% improvement in face
identification accuracy for individuals who are present in training
data, which is highly problematic given the norm in the field is to
not gather informed consent in the collection of training datasets.
Future work will apply this methodology to more models, train-
ing datasets and distance metrics (i.e. cosine distance) to see if
results are consistent. Following prior work [5, 9, 35], analysis
of face recognition model bias with respect to gender, skin type
and their intersections in large-scale face identification tasks is
needed, as well as tying results to representational bias in training
data. Additionally, the relationship between the number of images
of an individual in training data and their ability to be identified
is an interesting area of study. Finally, analysis of a face recog-
nition model’s feature space directly provides an alternative to a
task-based auditing approach, and may be fruitful for understating
nuances of inter- and intra-class differences.
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